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Abstract
This paper asks whether supertasters possess the criteria for
ideal critics that David Hume outlines in his essay "Of the
Standard of Taste." This might seem like a straightforward
question, but there is a paradox involving supertasters: They
possess more tastebuds than normal tasters, making it
reasonable to assume they fulfill the requirements for Humean
ideal critics with respect to taste. However, because they have
more tastebuds, supertasters find certain foods bitter that
normal tasters do not and thus negatively evaluate them. This
might indicate that supertasters actually make poor candidates
for being Humean ideal critics with respect to taste. This
paradox is resolved by concluding that supertasters do, in fact,
make good candidates for being Humean ideal critics provided
that they obtain a special sort of gustatory education. This
resolution depends upon the separation of personal and critical
taste and the assumption that critical taste is educable, an
assumption that will be discussed in this paper. This separation
threatens common-sense conceptions of the critic.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
People do not taste equally well. Supertasters, discussed in
more detail below, are individuals with more tastebuds than
the average person (a normal taster). This suggests that
supertasters might function well as ideal critics with regard to
the culinary arts. Upon closer inspection, other facts count
against this possibility. This paper asks whether supertasters
possess the criteria Hume delineates in his essay "Of the
Standard of Taste" for ideal critics.[1] It is important to
inquire into the nature of Humean ideal critics because Hume
believed that objective taste existed and that agreement on
aesthetic issues between critics with these attributes
constitutes the true standard of taste. If we want to
understand the true standard of taste we must understand the
nature of the ideal critic.
Simply stated, the paradox of supertasters in relation to their
status as ideal critics is: Supertasters possess more tastebuds
than do normal tasters, making it reasonable to think that
they would make good candidates for being Humean ideal
critics, with respect to taste. However, their dissimilar
physiology, i.e., the supertaster has more tastebuds. makes
certain foods taste more bitter and painful to the supertaster,
which leads him, in turn, to negatively evaluate these foods.
This suggests that supertasters might actually make worse
candidates for being ideal critics. The first horn of the
supertaster's paradox shows that the supertaster possesses
delicacy of taste. The later horn of the paradox demonstrates
that delicacy of taste is not itself sufficient for being an ideal

critic. This paper resolves this paradox by concluding that
supertasters do, in fact, make good candidates for being
Humean ideal critics, provided that they obtain a special sort
of gustatory education. This resolution depends on the
assumption that taste is educable, an assumption that will be
discussed in this paper.
2. The Five Attributes of a Humean Ideal Critic
Hume believed that agreement among ideal critics on
aesthetic issues constituted "the true standard of taste and
beauty."[2] Further, he thought that the "true judge of the
finer arts" (the ideal critic) possessed five attributes: "strong
sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice,
perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice."[3]
These five attributes are each necessary and are jointly
sufficient for a person to become a Humean ideal critic.
Hume's main criterion for being an ideal critic, and the criterion
that is surely most interesting in a gustatory context, is
delicacy of taste, which Hume defines as occurring when "the
organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at
the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the
composition: This we call delicacy of taste."[4]
Delicacy of taste is a more fundamental criterion than the
others, since without delicacy of taste a person could improve
their aesthetic judgments with neither practice nor
comparison. Thus, possessing delicacy of taste is a necessary
precursor to two of Hume's criteria.[5] Hume's first criterion,
strong sense, is so general and diffuse that it exists in the
requisite amount in every language user. The remaining
criteria is clearing one's prejudices; the supertaster's
prejudices can be cleared through the appropriate gustatory
education. Thus, if it can be shown that the supertaster
possesses delicacy of taste, then, given that he undertakes the
appropriate gustatory education, which clears his prejudices,
and actually does practice and compare gustatory aesthetic
objects, one can assume that he is a good candidate for being
a Humean ideal critic.[6] Delicacy of taste is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition for being an ideal critic. The clearing
of a person's prejudices plus delicacy of taste are jointly
necessary and sufficient for a person to become an ideal critic.
3. The Levels of Taste
In order to fully engage in these difficult questions, a method
for addressing the object of taste, whatever it is that taste
discerns, is needed. There is not some one property that
constitutes the object of taste. Rather, there are four levels of
taste, which are all possible objects of taste and should
therefore be distinguished. First, there are what tastes are
physically made out of (the actual molecules); these are the
basic constituents of taste. Second, there are the basic tastes.
The words used for basic tastes can be thought of as the most
fundamental words we have to describe the sense of taste.
These include, and are limited to, 'sour,' 'sweet,' 'salty,'
'bitter,' and 'umami.' It should be noted at the outset that
there is not a one-to-one correlation between first- and
second-level tastes. Tasting at this level is a function of how
many tastebuds a person has.
Third, Taste, with a capital T, is what most people think of as

taste and is sometimes called 'flavor.' This arises from the
addition of smell and touch to the basic tastes. As a result of
these sensory contributions there is a qualitative jump
between the third level of Taste and the second level of taste.
Smell provides most of the diversity of flavors beyond the five
second-level taste modalities. Words used to describe thirdlevel Tastes include both the literal and the metaphoric.
Examples include: 'spicy,' 'floral,' 'vanilla,' 'apple,' 'acid,' 'tart,'
'peppery,' 'honeyed,' 'saccharin,' 'pineapple,' 'rancid,' acrid,'
etc.
The fourth level of Taste, also capitalized because it includes
third-level Taste, refers to the higher level systems of Taste
connoisseurs have been trained to use. They include such
things as wine language, coffee language and chocolate
language. Words at this level are used more systematically and
rigorously than words at the third level. The Humean ideal
critic would operate within the third and fourth levels of Taste.
4. Physiology
Some simple physiology is needed in order to engage in the
the paradox of supertasters. The average human has
approximately 10,000 tastebuds, which are the organs of
taste, unevenly distributed over the tongue. Supertasters have
a higher density of tastebuds, and thus up to 70 times more
of them, than normal tasters do. An average taster "has about
184 taste buds per square centimeter of tongue, but some
people are 'supertasters' with 425 buds per square centimeter,
whereas those called 'non-tasters' average just 96 buds per
sq.cm."[7] More is better when it comes to tastebuds' tasting
second-level tastes, which is why the supertaster can taste
certain tastants that normal tasters cannot. These include
second-level tastes. Further, the indication that someone is a
supertaster is "based on the relative sensitivity to a bitter
compound called 6-n-propylthiouracil (PROP), supertasters are
overwhelmed by the bitterness in PROP, to the point of
revulsion,"[8] whereas normal tasters do not have such
revulsion to PROP.
5. The Supertaster' s Paradox
a. The positive horn
According to Yale University researcher Lynda Bartoshuk,
supertasters "perceive all tastes as more intense than do
tasters and non-tasters."[9] She further notes that
supertasters possess extraordinary skills of discrimination
between second-level tastes. Such discrimination, however,
does not necessarily carry over to third-level Tastes. This
means that while supertasters might initially be better able
than normal tasters to distinguish between a food that is
mildly bitter and one that is extremely bitter, they may not be
initially better able to distinguish between a wine that is floral
and one that has smoky notes.
Whether this first point influences a supertaster's suitability as
a Humean ideal critic depends on whether one believes that
the delicacy of taste criterion applies to the second or third
(and possibly fourth) levels of taste. The interesting point,
though, is that the third and fourth levels of Taste incorporate
second-level tastes even though they are not resolvable into

weighted sums of level-two tastes. This means that a person
such as a supertaster, who is better at tasting second-level
tastes, will be better at tasting third and fourth-level Tastes.
This is because (1) third- and fourth-level Taste is an
emergent sense composed of the senses of taste, smell and
touch; and (2) third- and fourth-level Taste is organized by
the sense of second-level taste.
Taste should be thought of as an emergent sense composed of
the senses of taste, smell and touch. These partnered senses
are the foundations of Taste. An emergent sense can be
defined as (1) arising out of more fundamental senses (taste,
smell, and touch); (2) being unpredictable or novel; and (3)
being irreducible under normal circumstances into these more
fundamental senses.
Further, third- and fourth-level Taste are organized by the
sense of second-level taste, which is, by itself, extremely weak
and limited. That is, second-level tastes help us to classify
third-level Tastes. Thus, a person who has a better sense of
taste, such as the supertaster, is also able to Taste better.
This is true primarily for pragmatic reasons; that is, secondtaste organizes Taste because neither of the other two
partnered senses (smell and touch) involved in Taste can do
the job. There are also two positive reasons for believing that
the sense of taste can organize Taste. First, the categories of
taste, including their hedonic aspects, are hard-wired and
therefore consistently used. This feature of being consistently
used is extremely important for any organizing principle since
the categories into which items (Tastes, in this case) are being
placed must not shift around. Second, there is a practical
reason to think that the sense of taste could organize Taste.
There are a relatively small number of taste modalities,
namely the five basic tastes, and all the variations within them
(less sweet, more bitter, saltier, etc.) occur within these
modalities. Thus, the underlying ontology of tastes is simple
enough to have practical value. Because of this, the
vocabulary used to describe these five modalities of taste is
available to supertasters and normal tasters alike.
The conclusion to be drawn from these two points is that the
sense of taste organizes Taste. Thus, the person who has a
better sense of taste (second-level) is in a better position to
tell us what contributory factors constitute particular Tastes.
Since the supertaster is better at distinguishing second-level
tastes, s/he will be better at distinguishing third- and fourthlevel Tastes because third- and fourth-level Taste is an
emergent sense coordinated by second-level taste. The ability
to better distinguish Tastes is one of the primary criteria for
possessing delicacy of taste, which is the major criterion of
being a Humean ideal critic. Thus, this first horn of the
paradox counts in favor of the possibility of the supertaster's
having delicacy of taste.
b. The negative horn: bitterness, unpleasantness and
pain
The negative horn of the paradox is constituted by the
aesthetic argument that a person cannot be a critic of items
that s/he does not enjoy. And by far the most talked about
case with regard to supertasters is that of bitterness. They
find foods bitter that most people would not, and because of

this they negatively evaluate these foods, whereas normal
tasters generally do not think of these foods as bitter and thus
do not, as a whole, negatively evaluate them. According to an
article by Maye Musk, since bitter foods evoke negative
evaluations, supertasters do not find pleasure in the tastes of
many foods that normal tasters enjoy, such as red wine,
chocolate, Brussels sprouts, spinach, peppers, raw vegetables,
certain salad greens, chili, grapefruit, cheese or olives.[10] It
seems reasonable to suggest that in order to be an ideal critic
one must have the capacity to enjoy, to some extent, all
foods.[11] Since supertasters negatively evaluate many foods
due to their perceived bitterness, supertasters' ability to be
ideal critics is brought into question.
Further, since tastebuds are surrounded by pain neurons,
supertasters experience more intense burning sensations when
eating spicy foods such as chilies, simply because they have
more trigeminal nerves to sense this burning. As an entry on
the Society for Neuroscience website indicates, "[t]he burning
heat set off by the chili pepper ingredient, capsaicin, is more
intense in supertasters than in others."[12] This also counts
against them being ideal critics because it means that
supertasters cannot enjoy spicy foods.
But perhaps the above claim that ideal critics should enjoy all
foods of which they are critics, at least to some extent, is
actually not so reasonable. The second horn of the
supertaster's paradox rests on the aesthetic presumption that
people cannot be critics of that which they do not enjoy. The
question is whether the supertaster's palate is "so fine" that
nothing will escape him, even though he does not enjoy
certain tastes. If something could "escape" the relevant organs
of the person who does not enjoy the aesthetic object in
question she will fail to be an ideal critic. Of course, this
conflates two issues: (1) which tastes will escape a person's
notice, and (2) which tastes a person will enjoy. There is one
case where fusing these two questions is non-controversial,
namely that a person cannot enjoy tastes that s/he does not
notice. The question of whether a person can critique foods
s/he does not enjoy will depend on (1) whether the critic at
hand has had the relevant practice necessary for his critique,
and (2) whether he has the motivation to undertake that
practice.
To begin, an argument is needed as to why people who do not
enjoy a certain class of things do not make very good critics of
that class. A rather controversial claim commences the
argument: Tastes that a person does not enjoy [13] will
escape notice. There are at least two interpretations of this
statement. First, it could mean that if a person does not enjoy
a particular taste then s/he actually has difficulty identifying it.
This claim seems patently implausible, for tastes which people
do not enjoy, such as bitterness, are often the easiest to pick
out.
A second interpretation is that a person who does not enjoy a
certain class of tastes, say the tastes that the supertaster
negatively evaluates and which normal tasters do not
negatively evaluate, cannot effectively discern between those
tastes or objectively evaluate them, either with regard to each
other or with regard to the entire spectrum of tastes. It is this

claim that more likely applies to the supertaster. And it
amounts to saying that if a person does not enjoy a set of
aesthetic objects, s/he has prejudices concerning them. This
further indicates that supertasters might not be very good
Humean ideal critics candidates, since they do not enjoy many
foods and thus have prejudices concerning food that most
normal tasters enjoy.
The case for this second claim is as follows: First, a person
who enjoys a set of aesthetic objects is more likely to know
the salient features of these objects. This is because that
person will likely have been forced to justify his or her
aesthetic preferences either to him- or herself or to others,
and in order to justify these aesthetic tastes s/he must know
what the salient features of the preferred objects are. Second,
since the person who enjoys a set of aesthetic objects will
know what its salient features are, s/he will be able to notice
subtle variations in these objects, since s/he will know where
to look for these variations. Third, the person who enjoys a set
of aesthetic objects is more likely to search out salient
features that other people have not considered primarily
because s/he will enjoy this process of searching out salient
features in aesthetic objects s/he loves. And fourth, a person
who enjoys a set of aesthetic objects will more likely search
out other aesthetic objects which aesthetically, because of
their relevant features, belong in that set.
That is, s/he will find connections between the aesthetic
objects s/he enjoys and other aesthetic objects which s/he
might enjoy, and which others who enjoy the original aesthetic
set will also enjoy. This is an important aspect of aesthetic
judgment and criticism. These four points support the general
aesthetic conclusion that a person cannot judge what s/he
does not find at least somewhat pleasurable. For instance, it is
difficult to imagine a first-class movie critic who does not
enjoy movies at least to some extent. In the case of the
supertaster, it is difficult to imagine one being an excellent
wine connoisseur because most supertasters find red wine
bitter and thus, unenjoyable.
A side point is necessary here: Even if enjoyment does not
help connoisseurs distinguish between tastes, it is plausible
that it helps them evaluate tastes. Of course, aesthetic
evaluations are dependent upon aesthetic descriptions.
Nevertheless, not all aesthetic evaluations are dependent upon
aesthetic properties, and thus there will be some cases in
which potential critics will agree on the aesthetic properties of
a work but not on the evaluation of it. So even if supertasters
could distinguish between third- (and fourth-) level Tastes,
their displeasure could make them less able to evaluate
tastants. This makes it difficult to see how the supertaster
could be a good candidate for being an ideal critic.
At this point the supertaster possesses at least one
counterargument to wage against this criticism. S/he might
say that since s/he dislikes numerous Tastes, s/he would be
more likely to search out Tastes s/he enjoysthat is, Tastes that
even to the supertaster are not too bitter or too sour. That is,
the circle of Tastes normal tasters enjoy circumscribes the
smaller circle of Tastes the supertaster enjoys. And this, in
turn, would mean that a hierarchy of Tastes, that is, a

hierarchy in terms of value, e.g., where caviar and blue cheese
are near the pinnacle, would have the supertaster's circle of
enjoyable Tastes at the top, since these Tastes are rarer and
most people would enjoy them. The implicit assumption here
is that rarity guarantees at least a minimum level of value.
This might be the case with vegetables in the brasicacae family
(cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli, brussel sprouts, kohlrabi and
kale), since these vegetables both taste bitter to supertasters
and are not generally seen as being at the high-end in a
hierarchy of Tastes. However, several other cases diverge
from this example, including red wine and coffee. Most normal
tasters think of red wine as near the pinnacle in a hierarchy of
tastes, but supertasters often find it bitter. It seems, then,
that the supertaster's counterargument will not work.
Nevertheless, in our ordinary lives we find cases where people
can often distinguish equally well between items they do not
enjoy and items they enjoy.
On a more general but related note, Jerrold Levinson asks in
his essay "Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real Problem,"
whether delicacy of taste always promotes aesthetic pleasure:
"[I]s the power of an object to reward one always enhanced
by the acquisition of greater fineness of discrimination?
Perhaps some works of art affect us more favorably if people
do not maximally discriminate their elements, but instead allow
them to make a more holistic impression on us."[14] It is
possible that discrimination at too fine a level does not give a
person further enjoyment, or that tastes discriminated too
finely will be enjoyed less than tastes not so finely
discriminated. This point is related to the discussion
concerning the relationship between a person's aesthetic
enjoyment of a given body of work and his or her ability to
critique that work. Levinson argues for the possibility that a
particular perceiver will not enjoy an aesthetic object past a
certain point. If this point is accepted, is it also necessary to
accept that that person will not make a good candidate for
being an ideal critic? That is, does this lack of enjoyment
counter that fine-grained perceiver's ability to be an ideal critic
in the first place? It is plausible that supertasters enjoy their
food less than normal tasters but that they nevertheless make
better candidates for being ideal critics than do normal tasters.
This would be a rather sad position for the supertaster to be
in, for it would mean that s/he would not enjoy the foods that
s/he recommends as a critic. This conclusion slides out of
Levinson's argument, also moving against the grain of the
conclusion which will be laid out in response to the negative
horn of the supertaster's paradox: that there is good reason to
believe that if a person does not enjoy a particular set of
aesthetic objects, then it is more difficult for him or her to be
a critic of them. It appears, then, that Levinson's criticism
needs to be met head-on, for it goes straight to the heart of
the supertaster's paradox.
How can the supertaster be an ideal critic if his or her palate is
so discriminating that s/he cannot even enjoy the aesthetic
objects s/he is attending? Levinson does not specify a point at
which a person's ability to discriminate will become too finegrained for them to enjoy a set of aesthetic objects, but
alludes to the possibility that such a point exists; that there is
some tradeoff between the whole work of art and its parts. My

proposal is that Levinson's point applies at the personal but
not the critical level. That is, it might very well be the case
that being too discriminating with regard to aesthetic objects
hinders a person's personal enjoyment of them, but that the
type of non-enjoyment engendered by being too discriminating
with regard to aesthetic objects is actually beneficial to a
person's critical faculties. This type of non-enjoyment brought
on by being too discriminating needs to be distinguished from
the more general dislike which hinders the ability of the
supertaster to be an ideal critic; for discriminating too much
makes a person a better, not a worse, critic,although it may
make a person enjoy an art work less on a personal level. That
is, it is possible that the supertaster might not personally
enjoy the foods he tastes because he discriminates between,
and within them, at too fine a level, but that this
discrimination might make the supertaster a better candidate
for being a Humean ideal critic.
If the supertaster were motivated to practice tasting various
red wines, perhaps s/he might then learn their salient
features, notice subtle variations regarding these features,
search out other relevant features and find other related
aesthetic objects. This is because there would be the
motivation to do so. All four of the supertaster's problems
related to enjoyment and one's ability to be critical are at root
a motivational problem onthe supertaster's part. Initially, s/he
does not want to compare the tastes of various red wines,
practice tasting Merlotand search out the salient features of
red wines because these things do not bring him pleasure. But
there are possible methods for countering such lack of
motivation, the primary one being a gustatory education
proper for the supertaster.
This in turn brings the relationship between motivation and
clearing one's "palate" of prejudice, which is the function of
the supertaster's education, to the fore. The basic idea behind
this connection is that the education the supertaster obtains
helps remove the prejudices from his or her criticisms because
s/he is educated in the proper usage of fourth-level Taste
language. As a result, the direction of the supertaster's
energies, but not his criticisms, will shift from the Tastes not
enjoyed themselves to the act of being a critic. That is, as the
supertaster undertakes a gustatory education, s/he changes
from being personally interested in the Tastes s/he is criticizing
to being critically interested in them. The supertaster's
motivation moves towards being a critic instead of being a
taster of tastes he does not enjoy. And this, in turn, leads to a
strengthening of the supertaster's motivation for Taste
criticism, since it is now toward something s/he does not
dislike.
The entire negative horn of the paradox is related to a
nagging skeptical question concerning the supertaster's ability
to be an ideal critic: Can the supertaster give taste
recommendations to regular tasters? If supertasters actually
taste differently than normal tasters, and they arguably do (As
Linda Bartoshuk writes, "The texture that a supertaster feels is
quite different"[15]), then how can they know what a food
tastes like to normal tasters? In some ways this line of
questioning could lead to absurd consequences, such as only
being able to issue taste recommendations to people with the

exact tastebud density as yourself, but it need not. For if
supertasters taste differently enough from normal tasters, that
is if the class of tastes that normal tasters enjoy and
supertasters do not enjoy is sufficiently large, then taste
recommendations from supertasters should merely be taken as
more finicky than taste recommendations made by normal
tasters. But what if supertasters enjoy different tastes than
normal tasters do? And further, what if they are unable to
communicate relevant information to normal tasters? That is,
what if somebody possessed all of the criteria of Hume's ideal
critic but could not communicate aesthetic judgments to
people who were not Humean ideal critics? Does this possibility
negate the possibility of supertasters' making good candidates
for ideal critics?
This line of questioning suggests that the supertaster is in
special need of a gustatory education if they are going to be
critics, so that they will be able to communicate with normal
tasters. This is because what they will learn while acquiring
such an education is how to use certain systems of taste
description. That is, they will learn how to use fourth-level
Taste language proficiently. And this, in turn, will enable them
to communicate with normal tasters without compromising the
benefits of their supertasting palates. A related reason that the
supertaster needs a particular gustatory education is to clear
his or her palate, or at least, his or her criticisms, of natural
prejudices towards certain foods, for these prejudices might
negate the possibility of becoming an ideal critic.
Overall, it should be obvious that this second horn of the
supertaster's paradox counts against the possibility of the
supertaster being an ideal critic. It shows that in the case of
the supertaster delicacy of taste is not a sufficient condition for
being an ideal critic because s/he could still have prejudices
which are not properly countered by the supertaster's delicacy
of taste. However, with the appropriate education this second
horn might be mitigated against.
6. The Paradox Resolved: Education
At first glance, the two horns of the supertaster's paradox
critics appear irresolvable. The first horn demonstrates that
the supertaster possesses delicacy of taste, while the second
horn demonstrates that the supertaster's delicacy of taste will
not by itself enable him or her to be an ideal critic. The
appropriate gustatory education, however, will enable the
supertaster to overcome prejudices and consequently to
become an ideal critic.
This, of course, assumes that taste is in some sense educable
-- at least one's critical if not personal taste. If this were not
the case, then the sensitivity of the supertaster would both be
an asset, because she has a finer sense of discriminating taste
than the normal tasters, but also a disadvantage, because she
will not be able to enjoy some food that normal tasters can. If
it is assumed (1) that one's personal preferences are not
educable, and (2) that the supertasters' paradox concerned
personal preferences, then there would be good reason to
believe that it could not be resolved. That is, if our critical
ability were reducible to our personal tastes, then we would
have to conclude that the supertaster's abilities were as much
of a burden or curse as an asset. Since the supertasters'

paradox concerns one's ability to be critical, which is educable,
and not one's personal preferences, it is resolvable via the
appropriate gustatory education. If this were so, then Hume's
ideal critic would be in danger of being pulled apart, for it
would mean that it would be possible for the ideal critic to
positively evaluate a certain good, in the role of critic, when
s/he personally did not enjoy it. This does not seem like a
tenable position, since the common usage of 'critic' includes
some measure of subjective pleasure. However, it is possible
that what the critic needs to be able to do is to communicate
aesthetic ideas to other people and not necessarily to
positively experience the expression of those ideas.
One way of cashing the Kant's claim in the Critique of
Judgment that aesthetic judgments of taste are universally
valid would be to say that they are "universally
communicable." That is, maybe all that the universal validity of
judgments of taste comes to is the critic's ability to
communicate them to everyone else. Critics can argue about
them, defend them, convince others of their validity, etc., and
none of this depends on the critic's personal enjoyment of the
aesthetic objects at hand. Of course, this move presumes that
one's personal and critical abilities are separable; this relies
on, among other things, the professionalism of the critic and
his or her motivation to be a critic, body of knowledge, etc.
There is a certain type of critic for whom this separation would
not work; that is the critic who says "The artwork feels (looks,
tastes, sounds) good to me, it should to you too." It is true
that the supertaster could probably not be this type of critic.
But I do not think that this type of critic is an ideal critic. In
addition to delicacy of taste, an ideal critic has the motivation
and education to become a critic. The separation of personal
and critical taste rests on the critic's education and motivation
and downplays personal preferences. This type of analysis can
be pushed into functionalist terms by stating that the function
of the critic is to guide others to beneficial aesthetic works; if
the critic does this, then there is no reason to worry about his
or her personal preferences, for it is possible that these are
outside the sphere of criticism.
It may also be the case that separating personal and critical
tastes might have value for the critic. Pauline Adema discusses
such a possibility in her paper, "Vicarious Consumption: Food,
Television and the Ambiguity of Modernity," where she outlines
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital and its
relation to taste. Cultural capital encompasses all advantages
a person possesses which bestow them with a higher status in
society. She writes that:
"The constant variable throughout this transformation is that a
wider knowledge of foods, an appreciation for foods that are
"acquired tastes," and familiarity with advanced preparation
techniques remain cultural capital. Knowing and using the
language of cuisine, including exercising one's educated palate,
separates those with cultural capital from ordinary
eaters."[16]
The realm of wine is a realm in which individuals attempt to
educate their tongue, or palate, in order to gain increased
cultural capital. The cultural capital the wine taster gains is
"good taste" in the eyes of society, but this type of cultural

capital would not be available to the wine taster unless the
sense of taste was, in some sense, educable. Wine Anorak,
"one of the UK's leading wine sites," notes that:
"The human palate is extremely adaptable. This is largely
because there's a huge learning component to taste. Innately,
the sorts of flavors we are drawn to are obvious ones. . . It's
only later that we acquire a taste for more challenging flavors
- those with an element of bitterness, texture or subtlety, for
example."[17]
There is no overriding reason to trust what a wine website
claims, but wine education could not occur if one's palate,
meaning one's taste, were not adaptable and educable.[18]
This must include an ability both to learn to enjoy unfamiliar
tastes and, to a more limited extent, to enjoy or critically
value tastes that one does not always enjoy. Again, for my
argument to succeed, only one's critical tastes and not one's
personal tastes need to be educable.
While there are no obvious accounts of a supertasters'
education, there is information that suggests that such an
education would be welcome. In a conversation between
research scientist Linda Bartoshuk and chef Jacques Pépin,
Bartoshuk remarks that when she visited the culinary school
Johnson & Wales she found that nearly all the students were
supertasters.[19] That is, being a supertaster is positively
correlated with being in culinary school.
This point supports the possibility of supertasters' making
good candidates for being Humean ideal critics. For who would
be better suited to be a critic of food than people who desire
to attend culinary school? Of course this is not a knock-down
argument, since people can be very interested in and
committed to endeavors at which they do not excel, but there
is a strong probability that the people who are good at X are
the people who do X, given the costs and benefits of doing
X.[20] This point also indicates that supertasters, or at least,
supertasters who are in culinary school, have a strong
motivation to become ideal critics, which is very important
with regard to clearing supertasters' prejudices towards certain
foods.
The negative horn of the paradox, specifically, calls attention
to one of the remaining criteria for being a Humean ideal
critic: the removal of one's prejudices. The supertaster is
naturally prejudiced against certain foods. If this prejudice is
retained, then the possibility of the supertaster's candidacy for
being an ideal critic is thrown into question. What I propose is
a special sort of education for the supertaster, namely one in
which the supertaster's natural prejudices against certain
tastes are removed or at least redirected. While the
supertaster may never come to fully enjoy the foods s/he
initially dislikes, such as red wine, a unique education will
remove the prejudice, if not from the supertaster's palate than
at least from his or her criticisms.
In order to show that the supertaster can be an ideal critic, an
outline of the supertaster's gustatory education is needed. It
should be noted that the education proposed is only for the
supertaster who wishes to become an ideal critic and should
not be thought of as mandatory for all supertasters. There are

two ways this education could proceed. First, it could attempt
to compel the supertaster to enjoy tastes that s/he does not
enjoy. This would be a way of directly removing the
supertaster's natural prejudices to certain types of food. An
example of this type of education would be for the supertaster
to be forced to drink several different types of red wine until
s/he either enjoyed them all or was taught which of those red
wines s/he was supposed to enjoy, that is, which one tasted
better. This type of education has many philosophical and
practical difficulties built into it. First, it might be impossible to
force people to enjoy tastes they do not originally enjoy.
Second, this process might negate the reasons outlined thus
far for believing that supertasters make good candidates for
being ideal critics. And third, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
non-circularly decide which tastes are the most valuable. This
is not the type of education that the supertaster needs.
The second type of education the supertaster could undertake,
and which would serve him or her better, would educate the
supertaster in the correct usage of fourth-level Taste language.
For example, the supertaster would learn what the various
notes in certain red wines were (that is, that vanilla notes are
present in a certain merlot or that dried fruit notes are present
in a cabernet sauvignon). Next, the supertaster would learn
how to use these fourth-level Taste words. In this way, the
supertaster's language would be coordinated with fellow users
of fourth-level Taste language and would thus enable him or
her to communicate recommendations to the public at large.
This educational method preserves the supertaster's
subjectivity. It does not force the supertaster to enjoy tastes
s/he does not enjoy. It merely gives the supertaster's
criticisms an objective validity they lacked before the
supertaster undertook such an education.
The reason the supertaster's education must be at the fourth
level of Taste language and not at the third level is that the
use of fourth-level Taste language is more rigorously and
objectively used, which is different from being objective, than
third-level Taste language.[21] In fact, the primary difference
between fourth-level Taste language and third-level Taste
language is that fourth-level Taste language is more strictly
used. It is a specialized jargon. When people use it they
usually have gustatory training, even if it is an informal one.
This education would be part of becoming an ideal critic and
thus would also provide motivation for the supertaster to
critique foods s/he does not enjoy. In short, once the
supertaster undertook this gustatory education, s/he would
have a motivation to be a critic and would consequently be
able to criticize foods s/he did not enjoy. This is because, in
some ways, the supertaster's post-education would be directed
towards the act of being a critic instead of towards the act of
tasting itself. Because of this shift, the supertaster would want
to compare tastes, to practice being a critic of various Merlots
and to generally be a critic of foods, most importantly of foods
that s/he does not subjectively enjoy. And yet this type of
education does not brainwash the supertaster into purging
subjective preferences and desires; it merely allows his or her
criticisms to be free from prejudice and to be communicated
effectively.

The most obvious example of this latter type of education is
exemplified in the rigorous education of wine professionals.
There are numerous sommelier certification programs, but the
most prestigious are the Court of Master Sommeliers and the
Institute of Masters of Wine. According to the Court of Master
Sommeliers' website, to become a Master Sommelier a person
must:
"Speak with authority on the wine areas of the world and their
products. Know the principal grape varieties used in
winemaking and the areas of the world where they are
cultivated. . . [And] identify, where appropriate, grape
varieties, country of origin, district of origin and vintages of
the wines taste."[22]
A sommelier is thus a professional taster and describer of
wines, but the words s/he uses to describe those wines are
not words from the third Taste level, but from the fourth, more
systematic, level. This is one reason why a sommelier must
possess such an extensive education: To learn the words with
which to describe wines at the fourth level of Taste.
Is this type of education sufficient for the supertaster to
become an ideal critic? The two objectives the supertaster's
education needs to meet are (1) to enable the supertaster to
communicate with normal tasters, and(2) to clear his or her
palate of prejudices. It is fairly obvious how an education in
the correct usage of fourth-level Taste language facilitates
supertasters' communication with normal tasters. This is true
for two primary reasons: (1) normal tasters also have the
ability of learning fourth-level Taste language; and (2) fourthlevel Taste language is more objectively and systematically
used than is third-level Taste language. These reasons imply
that it is possible for everyone to communicate using fourthlevel Taste language, including the supertaster.
But why should one think that this type of education clears the
supertaster of natural prejudices towards certain types of
food? As noted before, it might be the case that these
prejudices cannot be fully removed. It is possible that the
supertaster will never fully enjoy the taste of broccoli or of red
wine. But learning to use fourth-level Taste language will
remove the prejudice from the supertaster's criticisms. It will
accomplish this by enabling the supertaster to better
communicate with normal tasters. The supertaster qua taster
might still have prejudices towards certain foods but the
supertaster qua critic will not or, at the very least, his or her
language will not be prejudiced.
Thus, an education in fourth-level Taste language both clears
the supertaster's language of natural prejudices and enables
effective communication with normal tasters. But it should be
noted that the supertaster's prejudices do not occur only in his
or her language but also, and primarily, in the supertaster's
palate. Nothing said thus far clears the supertaster's palate of
prejudice; s/he has merely been enabled to effectively use
fourth-level Taste language and thus to critique foods, even
foods that his or her palate steers him away from.
7. Conclusion
The paradox of supertasters can be stated as follows:

Supertasters have more tastebuds than normal tasters,
suggesting that they would make good candidates for being
Humean ideal critics with respect to taste, but as they are also
overly sensitive to bitterness, there is reason to believe that
supertasters would be worse than normal tasters as
candidates for being Humean ideal critics with respect to taste.
The use of the analytic method of dividing tastes into levels
helped to navigate through this apparent paradox. This paper
showed that supertasters possess delicacy of taste, but that is
not sufficient to enable them to become ideal critics. In order
to become ideal critics they need to undertake a gustatory
education teaching them to correctly use fourth-level Taste
language. With such an education, the supertaster would fulfill
the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an ideal
critic.[23]
Endnotes
[1] David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste", in Essays: Moral.
Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1985), p. 229, Para. 23, available online at
www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361r15.html
[2] Ibid. This entire paper, of course, skips over the skeptical
worry that recommendations concerning taste cannot be given
and instead assumes that they can effectively be issued.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid, Para. 16. For a full discussion of the relationship
between Humes criteria see Raven, Francis, "Are Supertasters
Good Candidates For Being Humean Ideal Critics?" Master's
Thesis, 2004.
[5] For a full discussion of the relationship between Humes
criteria see Raven, Francis, "Are Supertasters Good Candidates
For Being Humean Ideal Critics?" Master's Thesis, 2004.
[6] It is important here to note that my argument up to this
point would be consistent for delicacy of taste to be either
innate or learned.
[7] The density of tastebuds given in this example states how
many tastebuds the supertaster must have in order to be
considered a supertaster, not how many tastebuds they might
have which is given in the figure above, namely that they
might possess up to 70 times as many tastebuds as a normal
taster.
[8] Bartoshuk L. M., "Taste Genetics: Supertasters" on the
BBC News website, [last updated 24 March, 2003 [cited 3
December 2003].
[10] Musk, Maye, "Are you a SuperTaster?" on the Nutrition
Central website, [health website] [cited 3 December 2003].
[11] Of course, Hume allows ideal critics to have important
differences in taste.
[12] "Taste Intensity" on the Society for Neuroscience website,
[cited February 19, 2004].
[13] This sweeps under the rug the difference between a
person not desiring a particular aesthetic object and a person

actively disliking that aesthetic object. But this is not the place
for this distinction.
[14] Levinson, Jerrold, "Hume's Standard of Taste: The Real
Problem," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (2002), p.
231.
[15] "An Education in Taste: A conversation with Linda
Bartoshuk and Jacques Pépin," Yale Medicine Magazine,
[Spring 1999] [cited 3 December 2003]); see
info.med.yale.edu/external/pubs/ym_sp99/cover/taste1.html.
[16] Adema, Pauline, "Vicarious Consumption: Food, Television
and the Ambiguity of Modernity," Journal of American &
Comparative Cultures, Volume 23, Issue 3, (2000), p.113.
[17] "Learning to taste" on
www.michaelgreenwine.com/sips_tips/palate_education.htm.
[19] "An Education in Taste: A conversation with Linda
Bartoshuk and Jacques Pépin," Yale Medicine Magazine,
[Spring 1999] [cited 3 December 2003]); see
info.med.yale.edu/external/pubs/ym_sp99/cover/taste1.html.
[20] Of course, this Platonic insistence that different people
are meant for different roles in society as a result of their
various capacities skirts many interesting issues ranging from
the ethical to the teleological and which unfortunately cannot
be discussed in this paper.
[21] It is also possibly more metaphoric, but this is a topic for
another paper.
[22] "Becoming a Master Sommelier," on the Court of Master
Sommeliers homepage, para. 2 [homepage] [cited 3
December 2003].
[23] I'd like to express my gratitude to Stephanie Ross,
without whose time and advice this paper would not have
been possible. I'd also like to thank Thaddeus Metz and Jon
McGinnis as well as the anonymous reviewers for reading and
commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
Francis Raven
3 Langdon St., Apt. 43
Cambridge, MA 02138
mailto:francisraven@gmail.com
Published Dec. , 2005

